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Abstract  24 
  25 
Recent neuroimaging work has demonstrated that the hippocampus is engaged when  26 
imagining the future, in some cases more than when remembering the past. It is possible that  27 
this hippocampal activation reflects recombining details into coherent scenarios and/or the  28 
encoding of these scenarios into memory for later use. However, inconsistent findings have  29 
emerged from recent studies of future simulation in patients with memory loss and  30 
hippocampal damage. Thus, it remains an open question as to whether the hippocampus is  31 
necessary for future simulation. In this review, we consider the findings from patient studies  32 
and the neuroimaging literature with respect to a new framework that highlights three  33 
component processes of simulation: accessing episodic details, recombining details, and  34 
encoding simulations. We attempt to reconcile these discrepancies between neuroimaging  35 
and patient studies by suggesting that different component processes of future simulation may  36 
be differentially affected by hippocampal damage. 37 Hippocampus and imagining the future     3 
 
  38 
1. Introduction  39 
  40 
In daily life, particularly during the unoccupied moments, we often revert to our inner mental  41 
world and engage with our aspects of our lives outside of the present. Mentally projecting  42 
ourselves back into the past or forwards into the future can take make forms – a cursory  43 
thought, a vague image, or a vivid and consuming scenario. There has been increasing  44 
interest in understanding the ways in which remembering and future thinking are similar or  45 
different, both in terms of cognitive and neural processes, and whether such characteristics  46 
are evident for various forms of past and future thinking (for recent reviews, see Schacter,  47 
Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Szpunar, 2010). These studies have been informed by a closely  48 
related line of neuroimaging research showing that when people are consumed by various  49 
forms of thoughts and images, these internally-directed cognitive activities are accompanied  50 
by a characteristic pattern of neural activity - known as the default network (Buckner,  51 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009).   52 
  53 
This network, which includes many regions traditionally associated with memory, such as the  54 
hippocampus, is also up-regulated by tasks that specifically require a focus on remembering  55 
and imagining personal experiences (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner,  56 
2007; Spreng et al., 2009). Motivated by findings that remembering and imagining engage  57 
the same ‘common core network’, we advanced the constructive episodic simulation  58 
hypothesis, which holds that the common neural activity for past and future reflects a reliance  59 
on memory to provide the details comprising both remembered and imagined event  60 
representations (Schacter & Addis, 2007). In that theory, as well as in this review, we focus  61 
on a particularly vivid form of future thinking: the imaginative construction or simulation of  62 
scenarios that might occur in one’s future. We hypothesized that the flexible use of episodic  63 
details from memory during imaginative simulations of the future can help to understand  64 
constructive aspects of memory, such as its susceptibility to distortion (see also Schacter,  65 
Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011). Like autobiographical memories of past experiences, these  66 
simulations are considered “episodic” in nature because they represent the self engaging in a  67 
specific event in a particular spatiotemporal context. And although the emphasis here is  68 
primarily on simulations located in the imagined future, primarily because of the adaptive  69 
value of such simulations for maximizing future success (Ingvar, 1985; Schacter & Addis,  70 
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Szpunar, 2010), simulations can also focus on  71 
present or past events; indeed, we have argued that many of the same processes discussed  72 
here are likely also applicable under those conditions (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter,  73 
2009).  74 
  75 
One of the more compelling and even unexpected findings from research on the neural  76 
underpinnings of episodic simulations is that the hippocampus, a region traditionally thought  77 
of as a “memory region”, can be engaged to a greater degree when imagining than  78 
remembering (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; for reviews, see Buckner, 2010; Schacter  79 
& Addis, 2009). Such findings raise the question of what is unique about episodic simulation  80 
or future thinking that recruits the hippocampus. In very general terms, it would appear that  81 
more intensive processing is required when imagining future events relative to retrieving past  82 
events, because the former requires construction of a novel event, whereas the latter involves  83 
retrieval of an already established event. However, determining what specific component  84 
processes underlie this ‘more intensive processing’, and which such processes rely on the  85 
hippocampus, is necessary to better understand this future>past effect. A number of candidate  86 Hippocampus and imagining the future     4 
 
cognitive processes exist. Although both remembering and imagining typically involve the  87 
reactivation of memories and episodic details comprising these memories, only imagining  88 
requires the additional step of recombining such details into a new arrangement – the  89 
imagined scenario. It is plausible that this recombination process would engage the  90 
hippocampus, given its role in relational memory processes that link together disparate bits of  91 
information (Eichenbaum, 2001). Also, if these newly constructed scenarios are ever to be  92 
accessed in future, they need to be encoded and stored in memory (Ingvar, 1985). In this  93 
review, we will discuss the conditions under which a hippocampal future>past effect  94 
emerges, and also consider recent work investigating whether hippocampal activation during  95 
future thinking reflects access to episodic details, recombining these details to construct  96 
specific scenarios, and/or the encoding of these scenarios into memory.  97 
  98 
A related line of enquiry is to determine not only whether the hippocampus is active during  99 
future simulation but whether it makes a critical and necessary contribution. While it has  100 
been long established that a functioning hippocampus is necessary for the retrieval of detailed  101 
autobiographical memories (for a review, see Moscovitch et al., 2005), it is less clear whether  102 
this is the case for future simulation (see Table 1 for a summary of patient cases discussed  103 
herein). While some patients with hippocampal damage and impaired episodic memory also  104 
exhibit difficulties in imagining detailed and coherent future events (Andelman, Hoofien,  105 
Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Race,  106 
Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011), other studies do not report imagination deficits in such patients.  107 
Spared simulation abilities in the context of hippocampal damage and memory loss have been  108 
reported in an adult developmental amnesic patient (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis,  109 
2010), a group of developmental amnesic school-aged children (Cooper, Vargha-Khadem,  110 
Gadian, & Maguire, 2011; see also, Hurley, Maguire, & Vargha-Khadem, in press), and a  111 
group of adult patients with bilateral hippocampal damage (Squire et al., 2010).  112 
  113 
--Insert Table 1 about here--  114 
  115 
Such findings imply that a fully intact hippocampus may not be required for future  116 
simulation. However, the inconsistent results yielded from these studies raise a number of  117 
important questions. Does the temporal extent of amnesia influence the degree to which  118 
imagined scenarios can be constructed? Does the age of onset of hippocampal damage affect  119 
the degree of impairment? Does the location of the damage within the hippocampus influence  120 
the pattern of spared and impaired abilities? Can residual hippocampal tissue support future  121 
simulation? Are particular simulation tasks better able to detect deficits? In considering the  122 
findings from patient studies in conjunction with those from neuroimaging literature, we will  123 
attempt to reconcile these discrepant results by suggesting that different component processes  124 
of future simulation may be differentially affected by hippocampal damage: although the  125 
processes of accessing and recombining details to construct and encode a future event are  126 
inherently related processes in healthy individuals, it is possible that in the damaged brain  127 
these processes are, to some extent, dissociable.   128 
  129 
2. Access to memory details: the episodic fodder for future simulations  130 
  131 
In recent years, neuroimaging has provided evidence to suggest that imagining the future  132 
relies on much of the same neural machinery as remembering the past. One hypothesis that  133 
such findings motivate is that memories must be reactivated in order to extract the  134 
information needed to ‘flesh out’ detailed simulations. Indeed, if simulations involve the  135 Hippocampus and imagining the future     5 
 
projection of the self in time beyond the present (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) and are to be  136 
meaningful for that individual, then personally-relevant episodic details from memory are  137 
needed. Such elements would include the major components of an episode, including the  138 
people, places and objects previously encountered by the individual. In their scene  139 
construction hypothesis, Hassabis and Maguire (2007) argue that spatial information is  140 
particularly important. A spatial framework provides a platform upon which to build the  141 
scenario, and without this, an imagined event would likely lack a sense of coherence.  142 
  143 
Although common hippocampal activity for past and future events is suggestive of access to  144 
mnemonic information during both tasks, it is not conclusive. Addis and Schacter (2008)  145 
examined whether hippocampal responses during remembering and imagining were  146 
modulated by subjective ratings of the detail comprising these events. Activity in the  147 
posterior hippocampus correlated with detail ratings for both past and future events,  148 
consistent with the idea that both tasks require access to episodic details. Moreover, Weiler,  149 
Suchan and Daum (2010b) found activity in the posterior hippocampus was associated with  150 
both past and future events, though the responses had differing timecourses. Nevertheless, the  151 
location of this neural response dovetails with studies implicating the posterior hippocampus  152 
in retrieval as opposed to encoding (Lepage, Habib, & Tulving, 1998; Prince, Daselaar, &  153 
Cabeza, 2005; Schacter & Wagner, 1999), in the reinstatement of previous conditions  154 
(Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2009; Preston, Shrager, Dudukovic, & Gabrieli, 2004),  155 
and in the amount of detail comprising autobiographical memory (Addis, Moscovitch,  156 
Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004).  157 
  158 
However, the most convincing evidence that access to episodic details may be necessary for  159 
future simulations comes from studies of patients with memory loss (see Table 1). One of the  160 
early observations of a link between past and future thinking came from Tulving (1985). In a  161 
discussion of K.C., a patient with dense autobiographical amnesia resulting from a head  162 
injury, it was also noted that K.C. exhibited difficulties in imagining specific episodes in his  163 
personal future. Similarly, amnesic patient D.B., who sustained brain damage as a result of  164 
cardiac arrest and anoxia, cannot remember or imagine personal events (Klein, Loftus, &  165 
Kihlstrom, 2002). In both cases, the neuroanatomical damage is not restricted to the  166 
hippocampus (patient KC has damage in and beyond the hippocampus, including extensive  167 
prefrontal damage, Rosenbaum et al., 2005; no neuroanatomical findings have been reported  168 
for patient D.B.). Nevertheless, these reports raised the possibility that there is a link between  169 
remembering and imagining – that being able to access details from episodic memory may be  170 
an important and perhaps necessary condition of the successful construction of episodic  171 
simulations.  172 
  173 
Similar results have been reported in patients with damage reported to be limited to the  174 
hippocampus. Hassabis et al. (2007) found that four out of five patients with hippocampal  175 
amnesia could not construct imaginary scenarios of everyday scenes: their constructions  176 
contained significantly less content that those of controls, and the details that were generated  177 
were not well integrated. Although the authors also found that providing patients with details  178 
did not improve their performance, the provided information was semantic in nature and  179 
therefore may not have been sufficient to support imaginings that have an episodic basis. One  180 
critical issue is whether these patients have damage circumscribed to the hippocampus.  181 
Although Maguire and Hassabis (2011) state these patients were “specifically selected” for  182 
damaged restricted to the hippocampus, Squire and colleagues (Squire, McDuff, & Frascino,  183 
2011) disagree with this assessment. They argue that aspects of the clinical profiles of these  184 Hippocampus and imagining the future     6 
 
patients (e.g., generalized atrophy, seizures, personality change) suggest the presence of  185 
damage outside of the hippocampus. They also note that the one patient in the Hassabis et al.  186 
(2007) study who did not exhibit imagination deficits had a different etiology  187 
(meningeoencephalitis and recurrent meningitis, versus limbic encephalitis in the four other  188 
patients), as well as residual hippocampal tissue and function (Hassabis et al., 2007).   189 
  190 
Race and colleagues (2011) examined the ability to remember and imagine in a group of  191 
eight amnesic patients with medial temporal damage. This study is important for two reasons.  192 
First, the paradigm included a condition in which participants were required to construct  193 
narratives when the details did not have to be retrieved from memory but were presented as  194 
pictures (also see Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011). When completing the past  195 
and future tasks, amnesic patients generated significantly fewer episodic details than did  196 
controls, and the number of episodic details for past and future narratives was correlated.  197 
Critically, hippocampal damage did not disrupt the ability to construct a narrative in the  198 
picture condition, where access to episodic memory was not required. Moreover,  199 
performance on the picture narrative task was not correlated with performance on the future  200 
task. Second, although the etiology and extent of damage varied across the eight patients,  201 
there was one patient in whom damage was confirmed as being limited to the hippocampus.  202 
Importantly, the performance of this patient mirrored that of the other patients who had some  203 
degree of extra-hippocampal temporal damage, suggesting that damage to the hippocampus  204 
alone is sufficient to disrupt future simulation. Together, the observations from this study  205 
further support the notion that in the context of hippocampal damage, it is an inability to  206 
access details in episodic memory, and not more general deficits in narrative ability, that  207 
underlies deficient episodic simulation performance.  208 
  209 
While studies of amnesia give insight into the ability to simulate when there is little, or no,  210 
access to episodic details, studies of aging  -- where deficits in accessing past events are  211 
present but comparatively milder -- have also provided relevant evidence. In a series of  212 
studies, we have examined the ability to remember and imagine in healthy and also in  213 
pathological aging (i.e., patients in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease), in which  214 
autobiographical memory is typically affected (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, &  215 
Moscovitch, 2002), and hippocampal atrophy and dysfunction are also evident (Hedden &  216 
Gabrieli, 2004). In these studies, we had participants generate memories of past events and  217 
simulations of future events in response to word cues and found that the number of episodic  218 
details comprising events in older or demented adults was reduced relative to appropriate  219 
control groups (for a review, see Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2010). Moreover, the number  220 
of episodic details for past events is strongly correlated with the number of details comprising  221 
future events. These correlations are consistently evident across old and young (Addis,  222 
Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008), and across demented and  223 
healthy older adults (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009), and exist even when  224 
controlling other factors that may more generally influence the detail of narratives, such as  225 
cognitive decline and verbal fluency (Addis, Sacchetti, et al., 2009). The deficits in episodic  226 
remembering and imagining that we have documented in older adults do also extend to a  227 
picture description task that does not require episodic memory (Gaesser et al., 2011).  228 
Nonetheless, we also found that the age deficits in remembering and imagining were still  229 
observed after controlling for general narrative abilities, as measured by this picture  230 
description task. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the reduction in episodic detail when  231 
older adults describe past and future events may be related to dysfunction in the regions  232 
supporting episodic detail, including the hippocampus (Addis, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011).   233 Hippocampus and imagining the future     7 
 
  234 
What is to be made, then, of patients with memory loss who can still imagine the future?  235 
Such findings appear to speak against the idea that access to memories is a critical precursor  236 
to future simulation. As noted earlier, Squire et al. (2010) reported that a group of patients  237 
with damage to the hippocampus showed an intact ability to create detailed imaginary future  238 
events. However, although these patients have hippocampal damage, it is notable that their  239 
degree of retrograde amnesia is minimal: these patients can retrieve events from the remote  240 
past, and only exhibit a mild (and non-significant) deficit for retrieving memories from the  241 
recent past. Thus, the results of this study could also be interpreted as supporting the notion  242 
that access to the past – even in the context of hippocampal damage – can provide a basis for  243 
imagining the future.   244 
  245 
However, there are reported cases of hippocampal damage that has differentially affected  246 
remembering but not imagining. For instance, Maguire and colleagues reported that  247 
developmentally amnesic patients who sustained hippocampal damage early in life can  248 
construct imaginary scenarios (Maguire et al., 2010; Hurley et al., in press; but see, Kwan,  249 
Carson, Addis, & Rosenbaum, 2010). Moreover, as noted earlier, one of the patients from the  250 
Hassabis et al. (2007) study could also complete their scene construction task. Interestingly,  251 
some of these patients have been noted to have residual hippocampal tissue that appears to be  252 
functional, in that it is activated during memory tasks (Maguire et al., 2010), although such  253 
activation has not yet been shown during future simulation. These researchers also report  254 
normal imagination abilities in a group of children with hippocampal damage and amnesia  255 
(Cooper et al., 2011), further suggesting that the time of onset of the amnesia may be an  256 
important consideration. It is possible that with early damage, these patients develop other  257 
strategies or rely either on residual episodic memories or detailed semantic information to  258 
construct scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011).   259 
  260 
It is also notable that these findings have emerged using the scene construction task. Hassabis  261 
et al. (2007) mention that this task was designed to “increase the dependence of constructions  262 
on generalized semantic memory representations”. On each trial, a sentence cue (e.g.,  263 
“Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach”) is provided to take participants into a  264 
generic scene; it is very likely that this scene can then be fleshed out with semantic detail.  265 
Thus, it is possible that these patients are able to complete this particular imagination task  266 
using detailed yet semantic representations of how certain scenes or episodes unfold, rather  267 
than extracting information from their own experiences. However, when the task requires  268 
creation of a specific and novel episode, similar patients (e.g., with developmental amnesia)  269 
show simulation deficits – particularly in the amount of episodic detail generated (Kwan et  270 
al., 2010). Although amnesics may generate fewer episodic details relative to controls, they  271 
sometimes show little or no reduction in the number of semantic details comprising their  272 
event narratives (Race et al., 2011). It has also been shown in other studies that patients with  273 
episodic, but not semantic, memory deficits can successfully complete future thinking tasks  274 
that are based primarily on general knowledge (e.g., non-personal future tasks; Klein et al.,  275 
2002).  276 
  277 
When faced with reduced or no access to episodic memory, it may be a natural compensation  278 
strategy to rely on semantic information to aid in describing autobiographical events. Using a  279 
scoring technique that specifically parses episodic from non-episodic information (Levine et  280 
al., 2002), we have also found that although older adults show a decline in the amount of  281 
episodic detail comprising their past and future events, they show a corresponding increase in  282 Hippocampus and imagining the future     8 
 
the amount of non-episodic, conceptual information (Addis et al., 2010; Addis et al., 2008;  283 
note also that this pattern extends to picture description; Gaesser et al., 2011). In line with  284 
this finding, older adults also show an increase, relative to young, in their recruitment of  285 
lateral temporal regions during autobiographical tasks (Addis et al., in revision); these regions  286 
are thought to mediate semantic and conceptual autobiographical information (Addis,  287 
McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Graham, Lee, Brett, & Patterson,  288 
2003).  289 
  290 
Another key question is whether access to episodic details is sufficient for future simulation  291 
to occur. It is likely that this ability is only a starting point; once episodic details are  292 
extracted, they still have to be used in a meaningful way, which we have argued requires  293 
additional processes such as detail recombination (e.g., Addis & Schacter, 2008; Schacter &  294 
Addis, 2009). Nonetheless, the findings discussed earlier of intact future simulation  295 
performance in hippocampal amnesics with relatively preserved autobiographical memories  296 
(Squire et al., 2010) suggests that access to episodic details may be sufficient for future  297 
simulation. By contrast, Andelman et al. (2010) reported a case study of a patient, M.C., with  298 
a bilateral hippocampal lesion and loss of autobiographical memory restricted only to the past  299 
3 years. Thus, at 27 years of age, she still had approximately 20 years of episodic memories  300 
to draw upon when completing a future simulation task. M.C. was, however, unable to do so:  301 
when asked to describe her personal future, her responses were vague and general, or she  302 
reported that she simply didn’t know. Because there was no quantitative assessment of future  303 
simulation performance in this case, the results must be interpreted cautiously. Still, they  304 
raise the possibility that while access to episodic details may be necessary in order to  305 
construct episodic simulations, it may not be sufficient.   306 
  307 
3. Detail recombination: constructing a coherent scenario  308 
  309 
As we have reviewed above, being able to access details from episodic memory can be  310 
conceptualized as an initial stage in the process of episodic simulation. Of course, having a  311 
jumble of details is useless if they cannot be recombined and integrated appropriately. We  312 
have argued that ‘detail recombination’ is critical to imagining coherent scenarios – the kinds  313 
of simulations one creates when thinking about experiences relevant in their daily lives.  314 
Given the role of the hippocampus, particularly the anterior hippocampus, in relational  315 
processing, we have argued that this region is likely critical in the ability to form coherent  316 
scenarios (e.g., Addis & Schacter, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2009).  317 
  318 
This proposal is based on an integration of findings from various neuroimaging studies. An  319 
early meta-analysis of medial temporal activity during memory tasks reported that the  320 
anterior portion of the hippocampus appears to be particularly responsive to tasks with  321 
relational demands (Schacter & Wagner, 1999); subsequent work has further supported this  322 
anterior localization of relational memory processes (e.g., Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti,  323 
& Sperling, 2007; Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2004; Jackson & Schacter, 2004;  324 
Kirwan & Stark, 2004; Staresina & Davachi, 2008, 2009). The role of this region within the  325 
realm of relational memory may be further refined, based on findings from Preston et al.  326 
(2004; see also Heckers, Zalesak, Weiss, Ditman, & Titone, 2004). This work suggests that  327 
the anterior hippocampus may be particularly involved in the recombination of details  328 
extracted from various memories. Using a transitive inference paradigm, participants first  329 
learned to associate one set of items (faces, A) with another set of items (houses, B). They  330 
then learned to associate those same houses (B) with a new set of items (novel faces, C).  331 Hippocampus and imagining the future     9 
 
During the scanning session, seeing items (A, B, or C) taken from any of the memories (A-B,  332 
B-C) resulted in posterior hippocampal activity, further implicating the posterior  333 
hippocampus in retrieval or reinstatement. However, seeing novel rearrangements of such  334 
details (A-C) resulted in selective anterior hippocampal activity. This recombination process  335 
can be considered analogous to future simulation, where we argue details extracted from  336 
different memories that may have not been encountered together in reality, are rearranged in  337 
imagination – and similarly, this recombination process should also engage the anterior  338 
hippocampus.   339 
  340 
More recently, Staresina and Davachi (2009) investigated hippocampal responses to the  341 
process of integrating details across time and space. They identified a region in the anterior  342 
hippocampus that was more responsive when details were presented in a spatiotemporally  343 
discontiguous manner (i.e., separated across time and space) and required integration, relative  344 
to when details were presented in a contiguous, integrated form. Conceptually, we suggest  345 
that this process again maps onto the kind of recombination thought to occur during  346 
simulation: an integration of details from memories formed in different spatiotemporal  347 
contexts.  348 
  349 
The findings of Preston et al. (2004) and Staresina and Davachi (2009) dovetail with those  350 
from a neuroimaging study of past and future detail. In that study, we (Addis & Schacter,  351 
2008) found common responses to detail of past and future events in posterior hippocampus,  352 
but the anterior hippocampus was responsive only to the amount of detail comprising future  353 
events – which are presumably recombined across spatiotemporally distinct experiences.  354 
Interestingly, we have replicated the finding of differential future activity within the anterior  355 
hippocampus across a number of studies using autobiographical cuing (e.g., Addis, Wong, et  356 
al., 2007; adapted from Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974) and experimental recombination  357 
paradigms (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009). While the cueing task requires an individual to generate  358 
future events from generic cues (nouns), the experimental recombination paradigm uses  359 
random rearrangements of episodic details (persons, places, objects) taken from the  360 
individual’s own memories, thus ensuring that detail recombination occurs. Moreover, these  361 
paradigms enable examination of activity during the initial construction of the future event  362 
when the cue is presented, and the subsequent elaboration of the event once it is in mind.  363 
With this approach, we have  found that over the course of a simulation trial, this activity  364 
typically emerges during the initial construction phase rather than being evident throughout  365 
the duration of a simulation trial (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Addis, Pan, et  366 
al., 2009; Addis, Wong, et al., 2007; Martin, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011).  This  367 
temporal pattern suggests that the differential future-related activity is associated with  368 
processes occurring early in the construction of future events, when detail recombination  369 
would be expected to occur. Other labs have also reported similar future>past effects in the  370 
anterior hippocampus. For instance, Weiler and colleagues (Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010a)  371 
found that imagining future events that had a low probability of occurring during the  372 
upcoming holidays was associated with more anterior hippocampal activity than events with  373 
a higher probability of occurring. The authors suggested that perhaps low probability events  374 
place a higher demand on the binding of disparate event features relative to high probability  375 
events that may be already planned.   376 
  377 
Determining the boundary conditions of the future>past effect will provide a better  378 
understanding of whether detail recombination is important for engaging the anterior aspect  379 
of the hippocampus. Importantly, we have recently shown that this effect is limited to certain  380 Hippocampus and imagining the future     10 
 
types of future events. We examined hippocampal activity when imagining specific (unique)  381 
and general (routine) future events, hypothesizing that constructing a specific future event  382 
should place greater demand on recombining details and hippocampal resources relative to  383 
constructing a generic future event that more closely relies on conceptual knowledge about  384 
routines (Addis et al., 2011). Indeed, our analysis supported this hypothesis, demonstrating  385 
that hippocampal activity was strongest when imagining specific future events relative to  386 
more generic and routinized ones.  Participant ratings confirmed that specific future events  387 
were more detailed and novel than general future events, further suggesting that the process  388 
of constructing an event that is both detailed and novel engages the anterior hippocampal  389 
region. Additionally, because these findings suggest that the hippocampus is not strongly  390 
engaged by constructing generic future events, it may not be surprising that patients with  391 
hippocampal damage can imagine the future in a gist-like, conceptual manner.   392 
  393 
These observations from neuroimaging studies suggest that dysfunction in the hippocampus  394 
may result in deficits in recombining details. Several findings suggest the presence of such  395 
difficulties. Hassabis et al. (2007) found that not only did the events constructed by  396 
hippocampal amnesics lack content overall, but the details they did generate were not well  397 
integrated and lacked a spatial coherence. In healthy older adults who show some degree of  398 
structural and functional dysfunction in the hippocampus (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), we  399 
found that the integration of memory details into simulations was reduced relative to young  400 
adults (Addis et al., 2010). Using the experimental recombination paradigm, we  401 
experimentally ‘extracted’ person, place and object details from different past events; random  402 
recombinations of a participant’s memory details were later presented during a future  403 
simulation task. Importantly, each future simulation was required to include the person, place  404 
and object details presented. While both groups were able to include all three details in the  405 
simulations, the young group was better able to integrate these three details into the same  406 
imagined spatiotemporal context. In contrast, older adults integrated on average two of the  407 
three details into the same spatiotemporal context, and then often touched on the third detail  408 
in a separate context, essentially resulting in a series of ‘mini-events’. These findings  409 
suggests that even with experimental support to access details from various episodic  410 
memories, the ability to integrate these details into a coherent scenario with a specific  411 
temporal and spatial context may be reduced in populations with compromised hippocampal  412 
function.   413 
  414 
Again, one might raise the question that if the hippocampus is necessary for detail  415 
recombination, how is it that some patients with hippocampal damage can imagine seemingly  416 
coherent future events? One issue is that not every study of future simulation in patients  417 
includes a measure of detail integration or spatial coherence and thus in instances where  418 
hippocampal patients can successfully imagine, it can be difficult to determine whether the  419 
scenarios constructed were in fact coherent. Maguire and Hassabis (2011) argue that the  420 
number of spatial references produced by the patients studied by Squire et al. (2010) appear  421 
reduced relative to the typical level of controls, suggesting that these patients may have been  422 
creating primarily semantic representations. Moreover, it is possible to imagine a future event  423 
with minimal, if any, detail recombination: one can “recast” past events into the future. It is  424 
possible that paradigms using single cues may elicit recasting. For instance, if shown the cue  425 
word “car”, one might recall a relevant experience (“my car breaking down and my husband  426 
picking me up”) and then imagine that experience unfolding in the same way in future. In  427 
many protocols, it is ensured that participants are generated novel scenarios (e.g., Addis,  428 
Wong, et al., 2007, 2008; Hassabis et al., 2007), but this is not always done or reported. In  429 Hippocampus and imagining the future     11 
 
order to circumvent this possibility, we designed an experimental recombination paradigm in  430 
which participants are required to recombine details extracted from their own past events  431 
(Addis et al., 2009). Although this paradigm has been employed with older adults (Addis et  432 
al., 2010), replicating our findings using the cue word paradigm, it has not yet been used to  433 
assess recombination abilities in patients with circumscribed hippocampal damage. The  434 
results of such a study would be of considerable interest.  435 
  436 
4. Memory for the future: encoding future simulations  437 
  438 
Differential engagement of the anterior hippocampus may also reflect the process of encoding  439 
newly-imagined scenarios. Indeed, the anterior portion of the hippocampus has been  440 
implicated in encoding (Schacter & Wagner, 1999; Spaniol et al., 2009), particularly for  441 
relational (e.g., Chua et al., 2007; Jackson & Schacter, 2004; Kirwan & Stark, 2004;  442 
Staresina & Davachi, 2008, 2009) and novel (Kohler, Danckert, Gati, & Menon, 2005)  443 
information. If the adaptive significance of simulating several alternative “behavioral modes”  444 
is to maximize success in anticipated situations (Ingvar, 1985) and flexible planning (Boyer,  445 
2008), then retaining this “fitness-relevant” information in memory for future reference is a  446 
necessary step. Nairne, Thompson and Pandeirada (2007) investigated whether information  447 
relevant to survival is remembered better than survival-irrelevant information. In that study,  448 
participants judged whether items were relevant to survival (having provisions and  449 
protection) or moving (moving to a foreign country) situations, or judged the items for  450 
pleasantness. In line with the idea that we are tuned to remember fitness-relevant information,  451 
subsequent memory performance was boosted for items rated as survival-relevant.  452 
Interestingly, more recent work using a variant of the paradigm developed by Nairne and  453 
colleagues suggests that the much of the benefit of “survival processing” may be attributable  454 
to the engagement of encoding processes that support planning for the future (Klein,  455 
Robertson, & Delton, 2010).  456 
  457 
Three kinds of evidence demonstrate the adaptive value of simulations. First, it is well  458 
established that simulations play an important role in psychological well-being. Being able to  459 
generate specific and detailed simulations of future events can enhance one’s ability to cope  460 
with upcoming situations (Brown, MacLeod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin,  461 
& Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). For instance, creating simulations about positive  462 
future outcomes can improve emotion regulation, resulting in decreased amounts of worry  463 
related to upcoming future events (Brown et al., 2002). In addition to helping one cope with  464 
the prospect of an upcoming event, mentally simulating appropriate actions for future  465 
stressful situations can enhance one’s ability to cope if and when those situations arise  466 
(Taylor & Schneider, 1989).   467 
  468 
Second, simulations are used when attempting to solve open-ended or ill-defined problems,  469 
where different possible solution paths need to be mentally evaluated. Using the Means-Ends  470 
Problem Solving Test, Sheldon and colleagues (Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011)  471 
examined the ability of older adults and patients with temporal lobe epilepsy to solve open- 472 
ended social problems. Both of these groups are known to have some degree of impairment  473 
on tasks of autobiographical memory (Addis, Moscovitch, & McAndrews, 2007; Levine et  474 
al., 2002; St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Levine, & McAndrews, 2009); older adults are also known  475 
to show reduced performance on episodic simulation tasks (Addis et al., 2008). It was found  476 
that when simulating solutions to ill-defined problems, both groups generated fewer relevant  477 
steps than controls. This finding suggests that without full access to episodic memory and the  478 Hippocampus and imagining the future     12 
 
ability to generate detailed simulations, the effectiveness of problem solving is reduced (for  479 
relevant neuroimaging evidence, see Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Spreng,  480 
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010).   481 
  482 
Third, recent studies have demonstrated that episodic simulation has a significant impact on  483 
temporal discounting of future rewards: when people imagine experiencing a reward in the  484 
future, they show an increased tendency to favor rewards that produce greater long-term  485 
payoffs, thereby countering the normal tendency to devalue delayed rewards (Benoit, Gilbert,  486 
& Burgress, 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010). Interestingly, fMRI data reveal that these effects  487 
of episodic simulation on temporal discounting are associated with increased coupling  488 
between activity in the hippocampus and prefrontal regions involved in reward representation  489 
(Benoit et al., 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010).  Related studies have shown that varying the  490 
manner in which memory is queried can also influence temporal discounting toward long- 491 
term payoffs when memory queries emphasize the production of patient (vs. impatient)  492 
thoughts (Weber et al., 2007). It would be interesting to approach effects of episodic  493 
simulation on temporal discounting from the theoretical perspective of query theory  494 
(Johnson, Haubl, & Keinan, 2007) and to determine whether the memory-based effects on  495 
temporal discounting have a similar neural basis to those shown for episodic simulation.  496 
  497 
In order to influence future behaviors and realize these adaptive benefits of simulation, it is  498 
important that simulations are encoded and maintained in memory (Ingvar, 1985; Szpunar,  499 
Addis, & Schacter, in press). There is indirect evidence to support this idea. For instance,  500 
individuals tend to act in a way that is consistent with or constrained by how they have  501 
imagined themselves in those situations (Johnson & Sherman, 1990), implying that some  502 
record of that simulation influences later behavior.  There is typically a high correspondence  503 
of stated intentions and subsequent behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1980). Consider also  504 
prospective memory, where an intention is encoded into memory and later accessed and  505 
implemented when triggered by a target event or time cue. It is likely that the intentions  506 
involved in prospective memory range in the degree to which they draw upon simulations.  507 
Particularly relevant to the idea of episodic simulation is the process of forming  508 
“implementation intentions” (Gollwitzer, 1999) which involve imagining and rehearsing a  509 
plan with reference to the specific future context in which it will be executed. Research has  510 
shown that creating implementation intentions significantly increases the likelihood of  511 
carrying out that intention (Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001; Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran,  512 
1997), again suggesting that these simulations are not only stored in memory but do influence  513 
future behavior. Poppenk and colleagues (Poppenk, Moscovitch, McIntosh, Ozcelik, & Craik,  514 
2010) directly investigated the process of encoding intentions, using fMRI to see whether  515 
later memory for intentions was associated with hippocampal activity during encoding. They  516 
found that successful encoding of intentions engaged the hippocampus, as did the encoding of  517 
other forms of information, such as present actions. But unique to the prospective task was  518 
the recruitment of frontopolar cortex, consistent with finding that damage to this region  519 
results in deficits of prospective memory (e.g., Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice,  520 
2000).  521 
  522 
If the involvement of the hippocampus in future simulation is only to encode imagined  523 
scenarios, then hippocampal damage would not necessarily result in an inability to construct  524 
simulations – just an inability to encode and retain them. There are some data to suggest that  525 
this might be the case (see Table 1). For instance, although children with hippocampal  526 
damage can imagine scenarios, when asked to recall them the following day, they do so with  527 Hippocampus and imagining the future     13 
 
less accuracy and consistency than healthy controls (Cooper et al., 2011). Additionally, adults  528 
with hippocampal damage appear to repeat themselves more than controls when describing  529 
future events, possibly indicative of a failure to sufficiently encode the scenario as it is  530 
constructed (Squire et al., 2010).   531 
  532 
We conducted an fMRI study (Martin et al., 2011) to investigate whether hippocampal  533 
activity during future simulation is indeed related to successful encoding by incorporating the  534 
experimental recombination (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009) and subsequent memory (e.g., Wagner  535 
et al., 1998) paradigms. During scanning, participants were presented with random  536 
recombinations of person, location, and object details taken from their own memories and for  537 
each set of details, they imagined a novel future event involving all three details. After  538 
scanning, participants completed an unexpected cued recall test, in which they were showed  539 
two details and had to recall the third. By this design, we had an objective measure of  540 
whether the critical details comprising each simulation were successfully encoded. As  541 
predicted, successfully encoded simulations were associated with greater activity in the  542 
anterior right hippocampus than simulations that were later forgotten. Moreover, the posterior  543 
right hippocampus was also modulated by encoding success. A functional connectivity  544 
analysis revealed that both the anterior and posterior hippocampus exhibited connectivity  545 
with each other and a wider brain network (including medial prefrontal and medial parietal  546 
regions) during successful encoding. When encoding was not successful, the posterior  547 
hippocampus did not show this pattern of connectivity. However, it is interesting to note that  548 
during unsuccessful encoding, the anterior region still exhibited connectivity with the wider  549 
core network. It is possible that this neural pattern reflects the attempt to construct a  550 
simulation, even if it is ultimately not encoded sufficiently to be recalled later.  We also  551 
found that the imagined events that were later-remembered were on average more detailed  552 
that later-forgotten ones, and activity in regions exhibiting an encoding effect was also  553 
modulated by the level of detail. Together, these observations suggest that constructing a  554 
memorable scenario may be related, at least in part, to how well the composite details were  555 
retrieved from memory and recombined.   556 
  557 
5. Future directions: mapping component processes to hippocampal regions  558 
  559 
Considering together the patient and neuroimaging data reviewed here, there appears to be  560 
evidence supporting the idea that there are three important component processes involved in  561 
the simulation of episodic future events. First, details stored in episodic memory with which  562 
to furnish the simulation must be accessed. Second, the details extracted from various  563 
memories need to be recombined and integrated into a spatiotemporal context in order imbue  564 
a simulation with a sense of coherence. Third, if a simulation is to influence and guide future  565 
behaviours, it needs to be successfully encoded into memory. The evidence reviewed herein  566 
suggests that these different processes all rely, to some extent, on the hippocampus. It  567 
remains an open and important question as to whether different subregions of the  568 
hippocampus are specifically associated with specific component processes. While the  569 
posterior hippocampus likely supports the retrieval of previously experienced details,  570 
particularly those spatial in nature, the anterior hippocampus supports the recombination of  571 
extracted details into a coherent scenario, and both regions support successful encoding.   572 
  573 
This framework may be able to inform the debate on whether hippocampal damage disrupts  574 
the ability to imagine the future (Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; Squire et al., 2010). It is critical  575 
that future research on patients with hippocampal damage employ more refined experimental  576 Hippocampus and imagining the future     14 
 
designs to probe whether detail access, detail recombination and/or encoding of simulations  577 
is disrupted. The case study approach may particularly important here. There is considerable  578 
variance of performance across patients with hippocampal damage, and it will be important to  579 
understand the specific patterns of spared and impaired sub-processes within each case.  580 
Moreover, it is likely that the nature and location of damage to the hippocampus is critical.  581 
Differential impairments of the construction and/or encoding of future simulations may  582 
emerge depending on the nature of the hippocampal damage: whether it is confined to the  583 
anterior and/or posterior aspects, affects primarily the right hippocampus, affects the entirety  584 
of the structure, or extends beyond its boundaries. Moreover, it will be critical in future  585 
studies to ascertain whether damage in amnesic patients is restricted to the hippocampus or  586 
extends more broadly.  587 
  588 
Another challenge will be to find ways in which to differentiate the process of recombining  589 
details to construct a simulation and the encoding of those simulations. These processes are  590 
closely related in two ways: cognitively, with more detailed simulations being more  591 
successfully encoded; and neurally, with both processes engaging the anterior right  592 
hippocampus. As such, they may be difficult to disentangle. One fruitful avenue may be to  593 
investigate whether detail recombination and successful encoding are mediated by specific  594 
hippocampal subfields. The hippocampal formation is a circuit comprised of several  595 
anatomically-distinct subregions, including the dentate gyrus, three cornu ammonis  596 
(CA1/CA2/CA3) areas, and the subiculum. Recent work suggests a functional distinction  597 
between the input structures into the hippocampus (dentate gyrus/CA2/CA3) and the output  598 
(subiculum/CA1). Specifically, while the input structures appear to be involved in encoding,  599 
the output structures may be more involved in binding (Carr, Rissman, & Wagner, 2010).  600 
Moreover, the finding that the dentate gyrus is involved in encoding is consistent with the  601 
hypothesis that the ability to form temporal associations among new experiences that happen  602 
close together in time is ultimately dependent upon the continuous production of new-born  603 
granule cells in the dentate gyrus (Aimone, Wiles, & Gage, 2006; Deng, Aimone, & Gage,  604 
2010). Extrapolating these findings to the realm of future simulation, it is possible that detail  605 
recombination during future simulation may be differentially associated with CA1/subiculum,  606 
and successful encoding with dentate gyrus/CA2/CA3. Recent developments in ultra-high- 607 
field 7T MRI to obtain exceptionally high resolution images of hippocampal subfield  608 
anatomy – including distinct layers within subfields (e.g. Kerchner et al., 2010) – will no  609 
doubt facilitate more detailed investigations of the roles of different hippocampal subfields.   610 
  611 
Neuroimaging studies to date suggest there may also be lateralization effects in the  612 
hippocampal activity that is differentially associated with future thinking. Specifically, we  613 
initially reported that hippocampal activity common to past and future events was evident in  614 
the left hippocampus, but that the future>past effect was specific to the right hippocampus  615 
(Addis, Wong, et al., 2007). A number of other studies finding future-related activity also  616 
report a right lateralization (Addis et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2011; Weiler et al., 2010a,  617 
2010b), although some studies report such activity is bilateral (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009).  618 
Interestingly, a patient with damage that affected only the right hippocampus exhibited  619 
difficulties in generating detailed future simulations (Race et al., 2011), suggesting the right  620 
hippocampus may indeed be critical to this ability.  However, it remains to be determined  621 
what specific contribution the right hippocampus might be making to future simulation.   622 
  623 
The research considered here is in an early stage of development. It is only during the past  624 
few years that studies examining the contribution of the hippocampus to imagining the future  625 Hippocampus and imagining the future     15 
 
have begun in earnest, and it is clear that much remains to be learned. Further integration of  626 
this new line of work with more firmly established research on hippocampal contributions to  627 
memory encoding and retrieval will be critical to advancing our understanding, as will  628 
integration with animal studies of such related phenomena as prospective coding in the  629 
hippocampus (e.g., Ferbinteanu & Shapiro, 2003; Foster & Wilson, 2006; Johnson & Redish,  630 
2007; for discussion, see Buckner, 2010).  We are hopeful that these kinds of studies will  631 
help to increase our understanding of the neural and cognitive processes that link memory  632 
and imagination, and in so doing, provide new insights into how the future depends on the  633 
past.   634 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